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parties must be evaluated by the quantum of illegality test proposed
by the Court.
Moreover, the Court in the instant case has determined that
Sirkin establishes a public policy which precludes a plaintiff from
recovery when his claim is founded upon commercial bribery. But
an analysis of the facts of that case draws into question whether such
a public policy was actually established by Sirkin. The agreement
in Sirkin was invalidated upon the long established principle that a
contract made in violation of a penal statute is void although not
expressly declared void.8 2  In McConnell, however, the contract
under consideration was not made in violation of a penal statute.
Yet the Court has determined that a precedent in which a penal
violation was the dominant consideration shall, upon grounds of public
policy, invalidate a performance in which such violation, even if
proven,3 was at best peripheral. Query, therefore, should the de-
fendant be vicariously benefited by setting up the illegality of an
action by the plaintiff with regard to a contract other than that in
issue and under which he benefited? 34
In the last analysis, therefore, the McConnell decision, though
here limited to actions founded upon commercial bribery, may, by
virtue of the quantum of illegality test proposed therein, lead to an
unwarranted extension of the doctrine of illegality.
M
CRIMINAL LAW-EvIDENcE-ADMISSIONS MADE AFTER INDICT-
MENT IN ABSENCE OF COUNSEL HELD INADMISSIBLE.-Defendant,
during his absence from New York, was indicted for murder in the
32 Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 App. Div. 384, 388, 108 N.Y. Supp.
830, 833 (1st Dep't 1908).
33 Though it appears that the plaintiff's act of performance has violated
the statute this was not in issue. McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures
Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 166 N.E.2d 494, 496, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (1960).
It has been held that if a plaintiff can make out his case without relying on
the illegal transaction he will be given recovery. See Ballin v. Fourteenth
St. Store, 54 Misc. 359, 361, 105 N.Y. Supp. 1028, 1030 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
But the Court, relying on the validity of the defenses, determined that this
holding did not apply. McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., supra
at 471, 166 N.E.2d at 497, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
34 The illegal act of the plaintiff in performance is in effect a different
transaction from the one sued upon. See Southwestern Shipping Corp. v.
National City Bank, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1959),
which stands for "the broad proposition . . . that a party unconnected with
an illegal agreement should not be permitted to reap a windfall by pleading
the illegality of that agreement, to which he was a stranger." McConnell v.
Commonwealth Pictures Corp., supra note 33 at 474, 166 N.E.2d at 499,
199 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (Froessel, J., dissenting).
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first degree. Later, by arrangement with his attorney, he volun-
tarily surrendered to New York police. In a post-indictment inter-
rogation by the police, during which he did not request the aid of
counsel, defendant made certain damaging admissions. These were
received into evidence at the trial over the objection of defendant.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the conviction, held that the ques-
tioning in the absence of counsel was a denial of defendant's consti-
tutional rights, and that the admission of the statements made during
that questioning was error. People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544,
166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
federal constitution does not guarantee the right to counsel in crim-
inal prosecutions in a state court in every instance,' as the sixth
amendment does in federal courts, 2 but only in particular circum-
stances. In a state capital case, a defendant has an absolute right
to assistance of counsel for his defense, 3 and this right extends not
only to the trial itself, but also to the preparation for the trial.4 In
a noncapital case, if special circumstances, such as the age and
ignorance of a defendant, indicate that unless the defendant has
assistance of counsel the effect will be fundamental unfairness, due
process requires that he have such assistance.5 During the interroga-
tion stage of a criminal investigation, the right to assistance of counsel
is not guaranteed, so that a voluntary confession obtained during
illegal detention of a suspect is admissible in evidence,6 and the mere
refusal to grant a suspect's request to confer with counsel at this
stage does not necessarily violate due process. 7 The use of a coerced
confession to obtain a conviction, however, is a denial of due process.8
A dissenting group in the United States Supreme Court, on the other
hand, contends that "if due process as defined in the Bill of Rights
requires appointment of counsel to represent defendants in federal
I Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
3 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) ; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485
(1945); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (dictum); Duque, Criminal
Cases-Right to Counsel, 31 CALn. S.B.J. 465, 477 (1956). In the Bute case,
the Court said: "[T]his Court repeatedly has held that failure to appoint
counsel to assist a defendant or to give a fair opportunity to the defendant's
counsel to assist him in his defense where charged with a capital crime is a
violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment." Bute v.
Illinois, supra at 676.
4 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932).
5 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335
U.S. 437 (1948).
6 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
7 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958).
8 Malinsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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prosecutions, due process demands that the same be done in state
prosecutions." 9 More recently, a dissent has argued that due process
requires that an accused who wants counsel should have one at any
moment after arrest.10
The constitution of New York State says that "in any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel .. ." " This right is denied
unless the accused is given reasonable time and fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice, and to prepare for trial with his
aid.' 2 By statute, when a defendant has been taken before a magis-
trate upon an arrest, he must be informed of his right to counsel 13
and allowed reasonable time to secure one.1 4 When a defendant
appears without counsel at the arraignment to the indictment, he
must be assigned counsel if he so desires. 15 By statute also, the
normal rule for the admissibility of confessions is voluntariness. 16
Since illegal detention 17 or unnecessary delay in arraignment after
arrest 18 do not of themselves make a confession obtained during
such periods inadmissible, a confession made by a suspect to the
police after arrest is admissible, as long as it is not induced through
coercion or false promises.19
The present decision adopted the rationale of the dissenting
opinion in People v. Spano,20 another New York Court of Appeals
case with a very similar fact pattern. There, defendant voluntarily
surrendered to the police after he had been indicted and a bench
warrant had been issued for his arrest. During police questioning,
his request to see his counsel was refused. The confession obtained
during that interrogation was admitted into evidence at the trial.
Defendant contended, inter alia, that upon his indictment his absolute
right to counsel became operative, and that no confession obtained in
the absence of counsel could be used without violating due process.
9 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 678 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
10 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
"1 N.Y. CoxsT. art. I, § 6.
12 People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
13 N.Y. CODE CLM. PROC. § 188.
14 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 189.
15 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 308.
16 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 395. It states: "A confession of a defend-
ant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can
be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear
produced by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney,
that he shall not be prosecuted therefor; but is not sufficient to warrant his
conviction, without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed."
17 Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484, 499 (1880).
18 People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94 (1932). -
19 People v. Garfalo, 207 N.Y. 141, 100 N.E. 698 (1912); People v. Har-
rington, 9 Misc.2d 216, 219, 169 N.Y.S.2d 342, 345 (Queens County Ct. 1957).
20 People v. Snano. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S2d 793 (1958),
rev'd, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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The dissenting opinion admitted that the normal test for admissibility
of a confession into evidence is voluntariness, 21 but argued that that
test alone was not applicable where the defendant has been indicted
and is therefore being questioned in the course of judicial, and not
investigatory, proceedings. Thus, the dissent concluded that this
questioning denied defendant two fundamental rights: "the right to
have the advice of a lawyer at every stage of the court proceeding,
and the right not to be forced to testify against oneself during such
a proceeding." 22 The majority, however, stated that the test to be
applied was still voluntariness, and that since the confession was
voluntary, it was properly admitted into evidence. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States,23 the majority of the Court
did not treat the question of the defendant's absolute right to counsel
after indictment, but did reverse the conviction on the ground that
the confession had been obtained through illegal methods. The con-
curring opinions of Justices Douglas 24 and Stewart 2  held for re-
versal on the ground that the right to counsel extended to the
preparation for trial, and that any questioning after indictment in
the absence of counsel, when defendant had requested the presence
of his counsel, was a denial of due process.
In the present case, the majority of the Court of Appeals stated:
"In viev of what happened in the Supreme Court we do not think we
are concluded by this court's decision in Spano." 26 In fact, the Court
of Appeals seemingly adopts the reasoning of its dissenting group in
Span o.27 On the other hand, after reiterating that the traditional
test for admissibility of a confession is voluntariness, the dissenting
opinion in Di Biasi said that it could find no basis for overruling the
Court of Appeal's decision in Spano, since a similar contention made
by defendant there had been rejected by the Court of Appeals and
had not been the basis for the Supreme Court's reversal.
21 Id. at 266, 150 N.E.2d at 231, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
22 Ibid.
23 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), reversing People v. Spano,
4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).24 Id. at 324 (concurring opinion of Douglas, J., in which Black and Brennan,
JJ., joined).25 Id. at 326 (concurring opinion of Stewart, J., in which Douglas and Bren-
nan, JJ., joined).
26 People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 550, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d
21, 25 (1960).
27 It is interesting to note that Chief Judge Conway and Judges Burke, Dye
and Froessel composed the majority group of the Court of Appeals in Spano,
and Judges Desmond, Fuld and Van Voorhis, the dissenting group. Chief
Judge Desmond and Judges Van Voorhis and Foster were the majority in
Di Biasi, with Judge Fuld concurring, and Judges Dye, Froessel and Burke
dissenting. It would seem that the fact that Judge Foster had taken the place
of Chief Judge Conway in the court had much to do with the different decision
in Di Biasi. It is also to be noted that Chief Judge Desmond wrote the dis-
senting opinion in Ypano, and the majority opinion in Di Biasi.
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The requirement that a defendant have effective assistance of
counsel in the preparation for trial 28 finds its realization in this
decision. The language of the decision could be interpreted to mean
that incriminating statements made in the absence of counsel after
indictment will not be admitted into evidence in any case. However,
it appears unlikely that the decision will be interpreted by the Court
of Appeals quite so broadly in its future decisions on this subject.
Since Di Biasi, the Court of Appeals in People v. Downs,29 a memo-
randum decision, affirmed a first degree murder conviction, despite
the fact that certain admissions obtained after indictment and in the
absence of counsel had been received into evidence. Chief Judge
Desmond alone dissented on the basis of Di Biasi. There are, how-
ever, a number of elements which distinguish Downs from Di Biasi.
In Downs, the defendant had not retained counsel prior to the inter-
rogation but had expressly waived his right to counsel.30 He did
not respond to questioning solicited by the Assistant District
Attorney, but instead volunteered the statements.8 ' Furthermore,
at the trial he repeated substantially the same admissions he had
previously made to the police and even added incriminating matter.3 2
Likewise, "defense counsel's opening statement . . . revealed sub-
stantially all the salient features of the statements." 3 Under the
circumstances of Di Biasi, statements made to police after indictment
and in the absence of counsel were inadmissible, even though the
defendant did not request the presence of his counsel. Under what
other circumstances the principle of Di Biasi will be applied is a
question which will have to await clarification by the Court of Appeals.
A
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION-MARITAL DEDUCTION-ELECTION TO
DEDUCT ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES FROM INCOME RATHER THAN
GROSS ESTATE, AS INFLUENCING MARITAL DEDUCTION BEQUEST.
UPHELD.-Testator bequeathed to his widow a fund equal to one-half
the entire value of his adjusted gross estate, all taxes to be taken
28 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); People v. McLaughlin, 291
N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
29 8 N.Y.2d 860, 168 N.E.2d 710, 203 N.Y.S.2d 908, cert. denied, 29 U.S.L.
WEEK 3111 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1960).
30 Supplemental Brief for Respondent, pp. 2-3, People v. Downs, supra note
29.
31 Id. at 2.
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id. at 5.
